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Dark Imagination: The Locus of Delightful Shudders1
by 
c. w. spinks
As a semiotician, I have long been fascinated with constructions of the human 
imagination—myth, literature, art, dreams, fantasies, hallucinations, lies, etc, for I think an 
examination of such semiotic oddities is necessary for a semiotic pretending to a scientific 
standard, despite the epistemological difficulty of dealing with sign constructs which are not 
“true”.  Of course, constructs which are mythic, ennobling, inspiring or characterized by any of 
the markers that we usually give to high art are believed to have enough “substance” that 
semioticians will still try to examine them even if they are epistemologically problematic. 
However, this is not especially true of those constructs with less substance, which are just as 
fascinating, deceptive, or manipulative unless the critic wishes to exorcize their negative qualities 
or to correct the users in some way. Rather when we examine “low” culture, we tend to catalog it 
or study it for other more “serious” purposes, but we almost always distance ourselves from it in 
some deflecting way2.
This deflection has been particularly true of the Gothic strain3 in literature and film—
something thought to be lurid, cheap, and/or adolescent, more for the circus and the freak show 
than serious art, something that belongs in the tabloids not in scholarly journals. Yet if you have 
ever ridden a roller coaster the second time, or asked for a ghost story on a dark night, or seen a 
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horror movie twice; if you have ever rubber-necked at an accident or thrilled to someone’s tragic 
story, or even enjoyed your own nightmares, then you probably are a practitioner of what I will 
call the dark imagination, whether it meets your aesthetic and scholarly standards or not. Such 
thrills, such chills, such shudders seem to have been with us a long time—perhaps in the guise of 
Lascaux cave initiations or just the description of a hunt’s adventures, or perhaps in the 
apocalyptic tales of a god’s vengeance or the warning tales of a conqueror’s practices, but 
certainly in the guise of the horror narrative, the frightening tale, and the Gothic.4 We apparently 
delight in being frighten5, for whatever the gothic touches, it touches something fundamental in 
us and we often thrill to its touch.
Usually when we give high cultural marks to the imagination, we take it to be the source 
of invention, innovation, discovery, and creativity. As Morris Peckham suggests in Man’s Rage 
for Chaos, aesthetically we tend to believe that art is an instrument of order. Our basic aesthetic 
expectation is that when culture deals with the disturbing, it uses art, as an some sort of 
Aristotelian catharsis, to control the destructive and to give vent to disruptive emotions. In short, 
under such a view, the imagination and art are agents of order, but despite that view there is a 
dark side to the imagination—a zone where what is normally repellant becomes attractive, what 
is normally forbidden becomes compulsory, or what is normally rejected becomes acceptable. 
Even our language speaks to this demarcation with regular and frequent attempts to represent a 
boundary between approved and disapproved uses of the imagination. For example, we really do 
speak of “high” and “low” art—giving tacit approval to the former and forever making the act of 
creativity suspect by its contamination with the later. Or we make myth an ambivalent term, 
meaning on the one hand the very soul of a culture or on the other its most pernicious lies; or we 
do the same to dreams, making it either the goals or aspirations of a person, or the useless 
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musings in someone’s night or day. Or, by the same token, we say fantasies liberate or enslave, 
and fancies function as amusements or perversions. We see negative memories as a 
compensatory working through a problem or as ghosts keeping us locked in the past. We 
continually judge such sign constructs in terms of their social impact; in short, like Wittgenstein 
says of the purpose of classification, the value of our imaginations and their constructs seems to 
be the use we put them to.
However, in a semiotic study of such things, what one has to do first, rather than just 
resorting to an explanation by Aristotelian catharsis, to appeal to Coleridge’s “willful suspension 
of disbelief”, or even to use Wittgensteinean logo-pragmatic distance, is to face cultural belief 
head-on and literally and willfully suspend cultural judgment6 in order to pay particular attention 
to how cultural boundaries are used. For example, the difference in cultural validation between a 
“vision” and an “hallucination”, between “self- confidence” and “self-deception”, between “self-
expression” and “perversion”, or between “habit” and “addiction”, just to name a few, are clearly 
part of a cultural attempt to adjudicate those particular boundaries. I would argue that the 
division between imagination and dark imagination is as good a distinction as any because it 
clearly owns the problematic nature of the sign processes and yet allows a distinction between 
cultural approval and disapproval without too much cultural control. Still as we all know, 
cultural disapproval does not mean that there is no attraction to the darker side, rather it is almost 
certain that there is eternal attraction toward the dark side that shows up again and again in our 
narratives—perhaps to allow us to understand our own limitations, perhaps to teach us our 
cultural roles, perhaps to meet some hunger that culture does not suffice, or perhaps the human 
mind just abhors someoneelse’s negative. Whatever, the dark imagination fascinates us and calls 
us whether it fits neatly into our semiotic schemes or cultural schemes or not; to recognize the 
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ambivalence of the dark is a first step in understanding how it works culturally and semiotically.
Interior Space and the Dark Imagination
For the last few years, I have used a Gothic theme, what I call here the dark imagination, 
to teach my survey classes in British Literature. It could be nothing more than a somewhat cheap 
device to catch the interest of students, who are more cinematic than literary, in how wonderfully 
“low brow” the “high brow” literature of Romantic and Victorian eras can be, but even so, it is 
an insightful device that shows the Gothic elements of the 19th century as an overlooked, but 
prevalent aspect of a newly massified literary culture. Students often claim that they do not know 
what I mean by the dark imagination, and although typical definitions of repression, Jungian 
Shadow, and Freudian deflection and projection never seem to make sense to them, they 
nevertheless follow the Gothic elements as easily as the “children of the night” follow their prey, 
and it introduces them to a whole host of cultural, literary, and semiotic problems that exist in 
19th century studies.
For example, the 19th century invented the interior self and gave us the intense reality we 
now call “psychological,”7 and it is helpful for students to understand how much of our modern 
concept of the psyche is really fixed by 18th and 19th century notions. From the mid 18th century 
and the sentimental hero to Freud and the tri-partite conscious, there was a persistent exploration 
and mapping of the interior space of the human mind8—done as much in literature as in science. 
Ironically enough, this was done by using exterior space as much as anything. The late 
Eighteenth century was fond of Prospect poetry in which a Bard would stand on a promontory 
alone and contemplative of some vista. There the Bard would recognize his bond to common 
humanity and the power of nature; or she would comment on her essential difference from the 
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herd and the passage of time; or they would note the mutability of the seasons and odd pleasures 
of melancholy, while highlighting the aesthetic nature of changing light, perspective, and 
experience. The physical pose of an isolated figure, in a natural or man-made setting, engaged in 
contemplation and reflection, is an effective device for investigation of the emotions, feelings, 
enthusiasms, fears and hopes of a speaker—who, of course, speaks in such a manner that he or 
she is overhead and thereby communicates, some clearer understanding of both the speaker’s and 
audience’s emotions to an audience who is not at the physical site nor in the emotional state.
As it develops, this over-heard prospect device fragments into a number of narrative 
forms which increasingly map the interior and emotional space of human beings. The graveyard 
poem contemplates the brevity and glory of human life. The ruins poem contemplates the brevity 
of human history and culture and the long shank of time. The nature poem contemplates the 
magnificence and eternality of the universe vs. the brevity and insignificance of the human 
perspective. By reliance on what Edmund Burke popularized as the Sublime and the need to feel 
the overwhelming feelings that come in such contrastive contemplations of the wee, small 
individual against a larger whole, these narratives were able to clef a facet that marks both a high 
spiritual imagination and a dark imagination. They may give a temporary catharsis to folks in 
times of great social change9, but they also allow a wonderfully emotional indulgence in the 
unknown, the unseen, and the unrealized. With each sublime marker, a troublesome emotion is 
demarcated, but so is the dark side of things, nature, and folk; so there is always a depressive and 
frightening other side which has to be explored further because it is there and because it 
intrigues.
Of course, two of the most melancholy sorts of these narratives are the Crepuscular 
School of poetry (known also as the Twilight School or the Graveyard School of poetry) and the 
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Gothic novel. Here the visual and narrative prospect is specifically the twilight, the graveyard, 
the decayed ruin, and the rhetorical device is a newer form of memento mori. Yet, unlike the 
Middle Ages, the 19th century mind was not particularly reminded of mortality to prepare for the 
World to Come, rather it indulged in the emotions of loneliness, regret, grief, loss, isolation, and 
even terror. But, of course, the most persistent, and long-lived form of the dark side imagination 
has been the Gothic novel10. Those narratives of ruins, dungeons, tortures, ghosts, villains, 
monsters, and other terrors which also delight, found themselves, for a few years, at the center of 
literary pleasuring. They torqued the past into the contemporaneous, conflated the familial with 
the unfamiliar, and blended the personal with the public enough to remind us of the fears we face 
and can conquer. They gave a time and a space to enjoy the delightful shudders of our fears in a 
safe way.
However, delightful terror is basically oxymoronic both attracting us and repelling us, 
demarcating the good and the forbidden, and exploring the margins of culture, knowledge, and 
action The dark imagination plays at the junction of the oxymoron of terrible beauty, or beautiful 
terror. It is the thrill/fear of boundaries and the source of the Sublime, and although it may be 
instructive, it is not necessarily safe. Whether it is the overwhelming intensity of light or dark, 
the wondrous perspective of time or size scale, the delicate balance between the legitimate and 
the forbidden, or the alluring edge between the known and the unknown11, the dark imagination 
is what every child does when it is given a boundary—at least what my children did when they 
had a boundary, such as not going into the street. They would stand with toes hanging over the 
curb daring the boundary setter and ever so slightly, but securely testing the boundary and the 
unbounded on the other side. The dark imagination is, I believe, playing with the other side in 
curiosity, rebellion, terror, and delight—temporary chaos for a later greater good—order, stress, 
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release, or just plain fun. And once one realizes that the operative aspects of the Sublime is 
reaction and emotional intensity, it is quite easy to begin to play in the fields of beautiful terrors, 
and that seems to have been the history of the Gothic—a field where the oxymoronic (at least of 
things attractive and things repulsive) are not just possible, but continuous and contiguous.12
This Gothic field of play here is exactly the same as the stage space and cultural space 
where Aristotelian catharsis is supposed to take place. It is the boundaried, demarcated, 
enculturated, and above all, the controlled space where darker things can be contained and kept 
from breaking out and destroying the cultural order. At least such control is the aesthetic cliché 
explaining the potential, never-ending recursive that happens in art. However, Morris Peckham’s 
contrary viewpoint is worth considering here; as he puts it (1967:314)
We rehearse for various roles all our lives, and for various patterns of behavior. 
We rehearse our national, our local, and our personal styles. These things we 
rehearse so that we may participate in a predicable world of social and 
environmental interaction. But we also must rehearse the power to perceive the 
failure, the necessary failure, of all those patterns of behavior. Art, as an 
adaptational mechanism, is reinforcement of the ability to be aware of the 
disparity between behavior pattern and the demands  consequent upon the 
interaction with the environment. Art is rehearsal for those real situations in which 
it is vital for our survival to endure cognitive tension, to refuse the comforts of 
validation by affective congruence when such validation is inappropriate because 
too vital interest are at stake; art is the reinforcement of the capacity to endure 
disorientation so that a real and significant problem may emerge. Art is the 
exposure to the tensions and problems of a false world so that man may endure 
exposing himself to the tensions and problems of the real world.
Although here I think Peckham too easily makes art psycho-socially functional at the expense of 
truth and value, his point is well taken that art—particularly dark art and dark imagination—does 
help individuals to “endure cognitive tension”, or “to refuse the comforts of validation”, or “to 
endure disorientation”. But the help offered here is individual and not cultural or social, and the 
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help for the problem is always recursive, leaving one to come back again for more stimulation by 
“delightful shudders”. Of course, such a mixed bag of ambivalences is pretty well characteristic 
of how the gothic has been regarded by critics and by readers. The chief difference being how 
much one is concerned for the control of those dark elements and what those dark elements may 
do to the individual. Whereas the most conservative critics see this dark pattern as an assault 
upon the cultural norms to be resisted,13 the more liberal ones see this as an expression of 
elements which the cultural norm has repressed. Readers, or viewers, of course, probably don’t 
care either way, but find entertainment value and some expressive value in the products of the 
dark imagination protected by some ever changing and escalating boundary that limits what is 
perceived as “excess” or “dangerous”.14
At any rate, such dark devices, particularly as gothic techniques, actually build on the 
potentially non-socializing Romantic Ego, as interior space which allows the exploration of a 
hitherto unrecognized region of human behavior. Prospect poetry spatialized reflection and 
introspection, and as Wordsworth defined poetry, it is the space where “emotion [is] recollected 
in tranquility.” It gathers for individual inspection an enormous range of psychological states to 
be articulated, examined, understood and propagated; so it looks at odd things—the uncanny, to 
use Freud’s word, or the “queer” to use Wittgenstein’s. When Wordsworth15 and Coleridge set 
out, in the Lyrical Ballads, to cast a “common light” over things “supernatural” and a 
“supernatural light” on things common, they begin the Romantic attempt to deal with the dark 
imagination because they seek to find the “common” in the individual. When Keats walks with 
melancholy, when Shelley praises Mutability, or when Byron laughs at society’s venality, they 
are essentially setting up a space for both estrangement and familiarization, those narrative 
processes which are used to describe events in ways which are thought to be non-mimetic and 
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allow one to explore what reason has prohibited. Of course, such uses of the dark imagination do 
not stop with the Romantics, the Victorians extrapolate it into the persistent form of the spiritual 
autobiography, the crisis lyric, the place setting for the spoken monolog, and ultimately to the 
motivation of character which marks the modern psychological novel, but the thrust of this 
articulation is always an articulation of an interior space of an individual who is fore-grounded 
by its relation to Nature and to Society.
Thus, terror is as much of place as it is of character or action—the lonely place, in the 
dark, around the corner, behind the door where viewer/reader sees and anticipates the dread thing 
of which the actors seem only remotely aware. It is wild setting, the mental gloom, the foggy 
night, the darkened room, the fetid tunnel. These are the loci of our delightful shudders, and the 
Gothic novel, with all of its apparati, is a prime example of this process of interior space 
articulated by the use of exterior space. Whether it be the clinky trapdoors of Udolpho, the 
spooky castles of Otronto, the moral and mountainous disquisitions of Frankenstein, the 
projective angst of Childe Rolland, the dichotomies of Jekyll and Hyde, or the transformations of 
Dracula, the presence of space and of locality put the narrative at a point the reader can focus on 
the hopes, fears, or anxieties he or she may have—an almost purely projective screen where artist 
and audience do a participatory dance of those hopes, fears, and anxieties. The locus of the dark 
imagination is just a playground—clearly demarcated as a place where things that normally are 
not discussed are examined and explored—certainly for the delight, and perhaps the edification, 
of the participants, but the playground will, like all playgrounds, be more for the affective 
enjoyment of the participants than for the social well-being of the gatekeepers to the playground.
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The Sublime and the Spooky 
Ironically and wondrously the root of all this terror and horror is the Sublime and an 
attempt to understand the beautiful. In an attempt to emotionalize an over-ratiocinated world, the 
18th and 19th centuries turned to the Doctrine of the Sublime as best expressed in Edmund 
Burke’s Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful 
(1756). Some of the earlier expressions of the cultural shift may have been enthusiasm, 
Methodism, mysticism, and antiquarianism16, but the major vector for developing emotion was 
the Sublime, and that numinous response to the universe, is clearly marked with a darker side, 
which Burke (and others) continually try to articulate and control. His very distinction between 
the beautiful and the sublime tries to get at the affective power of certain emotional structures. 
His desire to find “invariable and certain laws” (1756: 80) that “affect” the imagination shows 
him concerned for things which are uncontrollable and out of the ordinary. Like Locke (and 
Peirce after him), Burke is concerned with how new things are generated and how they are to be 
judged. As he puts it, “... the imagination is the most extensive province of pleasure and pain, as 
it is the region of our fears and our hopes, and of all our passions that are connected with 
them;....” (87) Every new thing the imagination creates is affected by such things, and what we 
must do is discover how they operate. Later he goes on to say, “So far as the imagination and the 
passions are concerned, I believe it true, that reason is little consulted; but where disposition, 
where decorum, where congruity are concerned, in short, wherever the best taste differs from the 
worst, I convinced that the understanding operates, ....” (98) 
So Burke tries to articulate how the understanding can operate in a place where reason is 
not strong,17 but he begins his articulation by defining the sublime, which acts to circumvent 
reason: “Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger, that is to say, 
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whatever is in any way sort terrible, or conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner 
analogous to terror is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion 
which the mind is capable of feeling.” (110) Burke then makes a distinction between pleasure 
and delight—the first being a positive emotion of its own, and the second being a emotion that 
happens when pain is relieved in some way; so he may qualify the sublime further as exempt 
from reason. He says: 
The passions which belong to self-preservation turn on pain and danger; they are simply 
painful when their causes immediately affect us; they are delightful when we have an idea 
of pain and danger, without being actually in such circumstances; this delight I have not 
called pleasure, because it turns on pain, and become it is different enough from any idea 
of positive pleasure. What ever excites this delight, I call sublime. (125) 
This delight is primarily “astonishment...a state of the soul in which all its motions are 
suspended, with some degree of horror.” (130) He continues: 
No passion so effectively robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear. 
For fear being an apprehension of pain and death, it operates in a manner that resembles 
actual pain. Whatever therefore is terrible, with regard to sight, is sublime too, whether 
this cause of terror be endured with greatness of dimensions or not; for it is impossible to 
look on anything as trifling, or contemptible, that may be dangerous. (130)
This extended definition from Burke should make it clear that the Sublime is treated 
ambivalently—as a source of power and emotion cast against reason and social control. It 
delights, but it does so by a pattern of substituting verisimilitude since pain and danger are not 
“actually” present but only “resemble” them. It is not a “positive” pleasure, but a relational 
delight. That is, the Sublime is pretty much close to what I have called the Dark Imagination— a 
narrative device that suggests the marginal, the need to explore the marginal, and the need to 
control the marginal.
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Categories and Maps of the Dark Imagination
Burke looks at the Sublime by listing a number of its categories18 for producing that 
delight. The list is telling for it draws a clear map of the places where the dark imagination is 
active. Fear is, of course as shown above, the first locus, for “Indeed terror is in all cases 
whatsoever, either more openly or latently, the ruling principle of the Sublime.” (131)  But 
generally “obscurity” is also necessary for terror, for when we do not know a situation or place, 
our imaginations are most active, and any sense of “clearness” is “an enemy to all enthusiasms 
whatsoever” (134) in such conditions. The second locus, after the dangerous and unclear, are 
those images which suggest “power”, for “In short, wheresoever we find strength, and in what 
lightsoever we look upon power, we shall all along observe the sublime the concomitant of  
terror, ...[emphasis mine].” (141)  For the third locus, he connects all “general privations,” such 
as “vacuity, darkness, solitude, and silence” (146) with the sublime, for lack of the familiar 
seems to peak our curiosity and fear. In short, terror is produced by images of threat, obscurity, 
power, emptiness, darkness, solitude, and silence—the very devices of the gothic narrative. 
The fourth locus is “vastness,” or “greatness” (147)—probably the best known of Burke’s 
characteristic. Here he is concerned with spatial extension “in length, height, or depth”, (147) but 
depth is the most affective and height the second most effective. He also allows that “extreme 
littleness is in some measure sublime; ...” (147), for “we become amazed and confounded at the 
wonders of minuteness; ....” The fifth locus is, of course, related to greatness, but since Burke 
believes it is the truest test of the sublime, he lists “infinity” as the fifth locus of “delightful 
horror”. (148)  Although there are no true infinities in nature, the limitations of the sensory 
system suggest the possibility, and the “succession” of certain similarities of views and the 
uniformity of their parts gives us a “kind of artificial infinity”19. The fifth locus was the artificial 
12
Trickster's Way, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/trickstersway/vol5/iss2/7
infinity of magnitude in building if the symmetry is appropriate because there is a kind of infinity 
in pleasing objects because the mind “is entertained by the promise of something more, and does 
not acquiesce in the present object of sense.” (153)  The sixth locus is “difficulty [for] when any 
work seems to have required immense force and labor to effect it, the idea is grand” (153), and 
the seventh is magnificence—“a great profusion of things, which are splendid in themselves” 
(154)—whether they be stars, fireworks, or great works of art, the “exact coherence and 
agreement” of the profusion of things, events, or images produces a sense of the sublime. These 
loci of the sublime are clearly aimed at the spatial and the constructional—both in the sense of 
perspective and architecture. Again the Sublime is clearly a marker for the Gothic narrative.20
The eighth locus moves more specifically to the senses, for this locus is light, or more 
specifically, its absence, for “darkness is more productive of sublime ideas than light” (156) 
except in those case where extreme light blots out vision as easily as darkness. So light works 
specifically in buildings as well; so that Burke pretty well, without using the term, defines a 
gothic castle as an example of the sublime: “... all edifices calculated to produce an idea of the 
sublime, ought rather to be dark and gloomy, and this for two reasons, the first is, that darkness 
itself on other occasions is known by the experience to have a greater effect than light. The 
second is, that to make an object striking, we should make it as different as possible form the 
objects with which we are immediately conversant .... ” (158) Of course, color, like light, effects 
the sublime too unless they are “soft and cheerful”; the highest degree of the sublime is produced 
by “sad and fuscous colors, as black, or brown, or deep purple and the like.” (159)  The ninth  
locus of the sublime has to do with sounds: “excessive loudness”; “shouting of multitudes”; 
(159) the suddenness of a sound, particularly a forceful one, but also “a low, tremulous, 
intermitting sounds,” (160) or “the cries of animals”. (161)   Of course, any of these sounds have 
13
Spinks: Dark Imagination: Dark Imagination: The Locus of Delightful Shudd
Published by Digital Commons @ Trinity, 2009
their sublime effect amplified in the dark. The tenth locus of the sublime is from smells and 
tastes, but their effect is minimal unless they are “excessive bitters, and intolerable stenches.” 
(162)  These sensations however can be only “odious” and the test “by which the sublimity of an 
image is to be tired, not whether it becomes mean when associated with mean ideas; but whether 
it, when united with images of an allowed grandeur, the whole composition is supported with 
dignity.” (163) 
These last loci deal primarily with the variant senses and their relations to terror, but 
Burke’s distinctions in the locus of smells and taste shows how clearly Burke wants to find the 
appropriate social context for discussing the delights shudders that come from the Sublime. Thus, 
at last Burke come to the position I mentioned earlier, the way to judge at least some of the loci 
of the sublime is by the purpose your classification. If it produces “dignity” then it is okay, but if 
not it is only “mean” or “odious.” So how one uses the instruments of terror, or how one 
approaches the loci of the delightful shudders, is the crux of the matter. Personally I am not so 
sure that “dignity” and “meanness” are poor criteria for judgment, but their social nature will 
demand an extended discussion on what “dignity” and “meanness” are and what are the 
consequences of the lack of the first and the presence of the second.
As long as we live with our creative brains, as long as we are imagining creatures, we will 
have to discuss the consequences of our narratives—dark, gothic, detective, sublime, social, or 
scientific. It is much as Roger Shattuck argues in his “exploration of the dark side of human 
ingenuity and imagination”, entitled Forbidden Knowledge, the history of the west has been a 
struggle between “liberation and limits.” Shattuck is fearful that our belief “that the free 
cultivation and circulation of ideas, opinions, and goods through all society (...) will in the long 
run promote our welfare” (1996: 6) is no longer working. By looking at the cautionary myths of 
14
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Prometheus, Pandora, Frankenstein, Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, and by examining what he 
believes is a post-modern misreading of the Marquis De Sade, he uses the gothic and the dark 
imagination to illustrate that our social constructions may be destroying themselves and us. But I 
don’t want to go that far—particularly with the dark imagination. The cautionary is certainly 
there, but the delight is also, and one needs to remember that the delight of the cautionary is as 
much the power of the dark imagination as are the things the dark imagination portrays. 
Knowledge of any sort is surely conditional rather than absolute, we do not live with the Ultimate 
Interpretant, and our knowledge—whether it is dark, gothic, sublime, social, criminal, or 
scientific—is, as Peirce argued, fabilisitic and in the process of determination. 
But how one regards this process of determination is telling. For example, Mishra, in The 
Gothic Sublime like any number of post moderns, is a disturbed and angsted by the unsurety of 
semiotic evolution. As he expresses it in rather revealing psychoanalytic language: 
“..., it is the sublime that regressively colonizes its descriptor. In the final analysis this is 
the terror of the sublime, the frighteningly contaminative force of the impossible idea 
itself. To collocate with the sublime, to cohabit with it, is to be faced with an instance of 
radical incommensurability. Of all the sublimes, the Gothic sublime (...) is most aware of 
this incommensurability and its inherent problems of transcendence. The Gothic subject 
never transcends, in this sense. Its self-empowerment, as the subject under the sign of the 
Gothic, always implies subservience to the trope. There is a pleasure of impotence in the 
face of the sublime. The sublime castrates, it humiliates by its (phallic) grandeur.” (1994: 
40)
 The problem is, if one returns the Freudian/Lacanian favor, holders of such views may have 
levers, but they have not place to put them. They would move the world, but they can’t stick to a 
fulcrum—perhaps they should look in the dark without calling it lack and then the earth might 
move for them.
Apparently the cultural hegemony does not handle the lack of control very well.  Rather 
one needs to remember that narratives, myths, and arguments don’t just edify, they also construct 
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experience; stories don’t just entertain us, they also delineate the past, present, and future for us; 
and narratives don’t just attract audiences, they also explicate the story teller, the world 
perceived, and the culture in which it is perceived. One of the fundamental boundaries of myth is 
what I will call, the dark imagination, which plays at the line of demarcation between the upper 
world and the lower world, between the temporal and the sacred, between waking and sleep, 
between consciousness and unconsciousness, and between the known and the unknown. The dark 
imagination hovers at the boundaries between semiosis, and out of the shadows of our cultural 
knowledge comes those aspects of culture which we’d rather not know or do not yet know, and 
when they do not cause us surprise and laughter, they cause shock, fear, terror, and horror. But 
such emotions cannot long be sustained in a cultural setting without some mediation, and the 
trickster impulse transform them by game, illusion, and narrative into devices for transforming 
the un-enculturated or the de-culturated into items of culture, or at least items of non-culture that 
can be appropriated contained by some semiotic process of verisimilitude or deflection. For me, I 
prefer to remember the stories that begin: 
Once upon a time, in a dark and strange place, there.....................
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1  This article was originally published in Linda Rogers  (Ed.) Thirdspace and applied semiotics across the disciplines.  
Madison, WI: Atwood Pres,  2003. 
2 For example, James B. Twitchell’s Dreadful Pleasures is detailed account of horror and modern horror films. But even 
though he is obviously fond of his subject, his psychological bent is to say: “The attraction of horror can be understood in 
essentially three ways:  (1)  as counterphobia or the satisfaction of overcoming objects of fear;  (2)  as ‘the return of the 
repressed’ or the compulsive projection of objects sublimated desire; and (3) as part of a more complicated rite of passage 
from onanism to reproductive sexuality.” (1985: 65). Throughout his examination of the history of horror, he continually 
comes back to this third reason as though it were the “real” explanation of why folk might be attracted to such this stuff 
without any apparent awareness that his own interest in the Gothic is driven by something else altogether.
3  I would, of course, include detective mysteries in this category.  In fact, they are often conflated, but when I first wrote 
this I was thinking mostly of gothic fiction. 
4 It is fair, I think. to see detective narratives as “thrilling” – not just because “the game is afoot”, as Holmes said, but 
because the narrative is a confrontation with “evil”  that is both “thrilling” and “controlled.” 
5 In the critical literature, distinctions are often made between “terror” and “horror”—the first being something which is 
personally threatening, and the second being either an always dissonant mystery (Twitchell 1985: 16-18) or a vicarious 
threat. (Heller 1987: 19) Note that both of these are positivistic clichés, for it assumed that actual threat to a person is 
“terrific” and “real” whereas semiotically displaced threats are “horrific” and just “psychological”. However, we all should 
recognize the play factor  involved in frightening narratives or  simulated experiences and know that  users of such sign 
constructs do not necessarily make the same distinction, and probably critics should not do so either—at least not do so too 
quickly.  Surely being  frighten  is  a  physiological  stimulus  response  process,  but  to  “play”  with  it  is  characteristic  of 
something much more semiotically complex. To be Cartesian here is to fall for a too simple a semiotic reading of such 
structures.
6 This is probably true for critics’ own cultural assumptions. If one does not, then the fear of chaos—dark, aesthetic, or 
barbaric—catches one in an existential  semiotic crises where one really hears nothing, sees nothing, and says nothing like a 
Derridian sculpture of the three monkeys.
7 Although we moderns and post-moderns consider reason to be an interior operation, this was not the cultural norm of the 
Eighteenth Century. Reason then was public, general, and non-emotive, and the counter-corrective is to highlight the private, 
the particular (if not peculiar) and the emotional. Thus, we tend to get the common oppositional cliché of Enlightenment 
Reason vs Romantic Emotion, but I would argue that the contrariety is one more of public and exterior vs private and 
interior in order to comment upon a differently perceived notion of society’s imperium.
8 In The Gothic Sublime, Vijay Mishra summarizes the history of the Gothic criticism to show how the Gothic world has 
been seen as “interiorized...into a private domain of neurotic sensibility” or read by William Patrick Day’s as a “modern 
dilemma of the failure of self-definition....” (9) He touches on David Punter’s reading of the Gothic as “transgressive texts” 
and Todorov’s non-psychoanalytic formal discussion of the Fantastic, but he settles for a psychoanalytic view in which 
“...the Gothic sublime is a version of the Lacanain Real as ‘the embodiment of a pure negativity’ into which the subject 
inscribes itself as an absence, a lack of the structure itself.” (17) 
9 Of course, the assumption here is that the decline of an agrarian economy and the shift to an industrial one not only forces  
the movement of populations but also a change in their perceptions of themselves and their role in nature and society. To be 
industrialized is to be psychologized?
10  This is followed closely (some would say entwined with) by the detective story, the confessions narrative, and the crime 
exposes in the growing publishing industry of newspapers, serialization, magazine short stories, and penny dreadfuls.
11 Roger Shattuck describes this trait more negatively than I would as “the Wife of Bath effect”: “We are discontent with 
our  lot,  whatever  it  is,  just  because  it  is  ours.  We covet  what  is  not  ours  because  it  represents  otherness.  Following 
Montaigne, I have called this combination of perverse impulses ‘soul error’....” (1996: 71)
12 The detection process is, of course, one of filtering the relevant from the irrelevant, the implicatory from the misleading, 
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appearance from reality, or the truth from the false. The detector is a questor for lost persons and lost things.
13 This is clearly seen in the public and political debates over fictional modes and their use of sex and violence: gothic 
novels in the 19th century or gothic films in the 20th, comic books, movies, television, music, the Internet, etc. Libertarians 
want no restrictions on expression and conservatives want some controls. It is by no means accidental that at the end of the 
20th century, this often turns on a private vs. public space argument. Some of that is due to gambit strategies on the parts of 
both sides; some is due to our own traditions of free speech, but I think some of it is due to the fact that these devices are, by 
their very nature, articulators of private space in a public discourse, and that is the reason both sides draw this line over these 
issues. 
14 This escalating boundary of excess is no simple problem. Such stimulations of the repressed side tend to become passé as  
one is exposed to them, and users of dark signs are often wont to seek bigger, better, and more thrilling uses. At what point  
this becomes a personal problem or a social problem is, of course, the subject of the debate between the Libertarians and 
Conservatives about private and public space. 
15 As Mishra puts it:: “Wordsworth is remarkably Kantian...and is conscious of the intersubjective nature of the sublime 
experience.  ....  One  gains  access  to  the  sublime  through  self-contemplation,  unrestrained  by  other  demands  and 
imperatives. .... The subject may be sovereign, but he or she is nevertheless pushed by the sublime toward a redefinition of 
his or her sovereignty by the need to confront his or her own incompletion in the presence of limitlessness, turbulent and 
ungraspable.” (1994: 35) 
16 Antiquarianism has its roots in the growing nationalism of the 16th and 17th centuries. It was recognition of the importance 
of the history of a specific locale, but it also fed into the 19th century medieval revivals by use of prospect poetry at ruins, the 
Romantic desire for sensuality, and the Victorian struggle with change. Thus, the late 19th century produces the neo-gothic 
revival in architecture and poetry that addresses both nostalgia for simpler times and projection of values on to that same 
nostalgic structure.
17   This is, of course, the nightmare worry of any neocon – their “reason” is subject to some “emotion” and one had 
better be cautious.  Moreover, it is worth considering how detective narratives play out in terms of conservative and liberal 
notions of society.  Surely, there is something of a mapping of class struggle here.
18 One could, of course, use Todorov’s division of the Fantastic into the categories of the fantastic, the uncanny, 
and the marvelous. Several critics have applied his classification as a device for commenting on the significance of 
the Gothic. According to Todorov, the fantastic deals with 
“...a world [which] is indeed our world, the one we know, a world without devils, sylphides, or vampires, 
[but] there occurs an event which cannot be explained by the laws of the same familiar world. The person 
who experiences the event must opt for one of two possible solutions: either he is the victim of an illusion 
of the sense, of a product of the imagination—and laws of the world then remain what they are; or else, the 
event has indeed taken place, it is an integral part of reality—but then this reality is controlled by laws 
unknown to us. Either the devils is an illusion, an imaginary being; or else he really exists, precisely like 
other beings—with this reservation, that we encounter him infrequently.
The fantastic occupies the duration of this uncertainty. Once we choose one answer or the other, we leave 
the fantastic for a neighboring genre. The fantastic is that hesitation experienced by a person who knows 
only the laws of nature, confronting an apparently supernatural event.” (1973: 25) 
But Burke’s categories seem to be closer to the 19th century and the origins of Gothic or detective fiction, and 
therefore I prefer to use them.
19 Burke mentions specifically rotundas and ancient heathen temples, and this locus with the next one of “magnitude in 
building”  is  probably the rationale for  the use of  the term “Gothic” as  both a  medieval  art  form and  a literary term. 
Apparently the 17th and 18th centuries, followed by the 19th and 20th centuries, were impressed with what they perceived as 
sublime,  primitive  structures  in  the  Gothic  cathedrals  or  in  ruins  like  Stonehenge.  Their  historical  sense,  of  the  not 
contemporary, caused them to identify such structures with the generically primitive, the Goths—thus the term Gothic as a 
descriptor of “primitive” and “medieval” structures and situations. (See Bayer-Berenbaum 1982: 47-72 or Punter 1996: 4-8) 
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20  I think these Burkean characteristics of perspective are easily seen in film noir.  What, after all, is detective fiction but 
instruction in perception or redirection?
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